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Abstract
We develop a model of wage determination with private information in a unionized
imperfectly competitive industry. Under two di®erent bargaining structures (¯rm-level
vs industry-level), we investigate the e®ects of the degree of product di®erentiation and
the type of market competition (Bertrand vs Cournot competition) on the negotiated
wage and the strike activity. If the wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level,
then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of
product di®erentiation whatever the type of market competition. However, if the wage
bargaining takes place at the ¯rm-level, then wages and strikes are increasing with
the degree of product di®erentiation, and the strike activity is smaller under Bertrand
than under Cournot competition.
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473945.1 Introduction
Empirical literature suggests that industry-speci¯c factors are key determinants of strike
activity [see e.g. Tracy (1986)]. Key determinants are, among others, the type of industry,
the industry size, the type of market competition, the industry concentration, and the size
of the bargaining unit. Despite this evidence, the theoretical literature on wage bargaining
in industries with market power has neglected the study of the relationship among the
type of market competition, the level of bargaining and the strike activity.
The purpose of this paper is to study how institutional features such as the bargaining
structure and how industry factors such as the product market competition will a®ect
the outcome of wage negotiations in unionized duopolistic industries. Within an incom-
plete information framework, we develop a model of wage determination in a product
di®erentiated duopoly. First, unions and ¯rms negotiate over the wage level according
to institutional features (industry-level vs ¯rm-level bargaining). Second, ¯rms compete
either in quantities (Cournot competition) or in prices (Bertrand competition) on the
product market. To describe the wage bargaining process, we adopt Rubinstein's (1982)
alternating-o®er bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information, which allows
the occurrence of strikes at equilibrium.
Related contributions are Davidson (1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988), and Dowrick
(1989). When ¯rms produce in related product markets, wage settlements create spillover
e®ects (by altering the ¯rms' relative competitive positions in the product market) that
have implications for the outcome of negotiations. Davidson (1988) and Horn and Wolin-
sky (1988) have studied the impact of wage spillover e®ects on the interaction of union-¯rm
bargaining and duopolistic quantity-setting. Around the same time, Dowrick (1989) has
used a conjectural variation oligopoly model to study how product market power and
pro¯tability are related to wages. More recently, Dhillon and Petrakis (2001) have in-
vestigated, for the case of centralized bargaining in oligopolistic industries, the e®ects of
the degree of product di®erentiation and the type of market competition (Bertrand vs
Cournot competition) on the negotiated wage. But, all these previous studies have con-
sidered complete information frameworks so that strikes, which waste industry resources,
cannot occur at equilibrium.1
So, we go beyond the analysis o®ered in Davidson (1988), Horn and Wolinsky (1988),
Dowrick (1989) and Dhillon and Petrakis (2001), by developing a model that enables us
to investigate for di®erent bargaining structures and types of market competition how
private information as well as spillover e®ects across payo® functions created by contract
1Strikes data seem to have a signi¯cant impact on the wage-employment relationship for collective
negotiations [see e.g. Kennan and Wilson (1989), Vannetelbosch (1996)].
1settlements a®ect the wages, the level of employment and the strike activity. We show
that, if the wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level, then both the wage outcome
and the strike activity do not depend on the degree of product di®erentiation whatever
the type of market competition. Indeed, since wage spillover e®ects are internalized at the
industry-level, wage bargaining a®ects employment and pro¯ts only through the overall
level of industry demand. As a consequence, the strike activity is the same under both
Bertrand and Cournot competition and is independent of product di®erentiation.
However, if the wage bargaining takes place at the ¯rm-level, we show that wages and
strikes are increasing with the degree of product di®erentiation. Since ¯rm-level bargaining
does not internalize the wage spillover e®ects and these spillover e®ects are decreasing with
the degree of product di®erentiation, the strike activity at the ¯rm-level is increasing with
product di®erentiation. Indeed, wage spillover e®ects create incentives to lower wages in
order to gain a larger share of the product market and to induce more concessions and less
con°icts or strikes in wage bargains. These incentives are reinforced the less di®erentiated
the products or brands are. Moreover, the strike activity under Bertrand competition is
smaller than under Cournot competition. This is due to the fact that wage spillover e®ects
are greater under Bertrand competition.
Contrary to the complete information framework, the ¯rm-level wage outcome un-
der Bertrand competition will not necessarily be lower than the ¯rm-level wage outcome
under Cournot competition. Moreover, the ¯rm-level wage outcome under Cournot com-
petition will not necessarily be lower than the industry-level wage outcome under Cournot
(or Bertrand) competition. However, if it is commonly known that the local union is
much stronger than the local ¯rm and the degree of product di®erentiation is small, then
Bertrand competition will decrease the ¯rm-level wage at equilibrium and industry-level
bargaining will increase the wage at equilibrium.
Finally, the strike activity is smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition
when bargaining is decentralized. So, Bertrand competition increases the disparity, in
terms of strike activity, of both bargaining structures.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented. The Bertrand
and Cournot games in the duopolistic market are solved assuming that the wages have
already been determined. Section 3 describes the wage bargaining game and solves this
game for the industry-level bargaining system. It also analyses the relationship between
the industry-level bargaining structure, the degree of product di®erentiation, and the strike
activity. Section 4 is devoted to the wage bargaining game for the ¯rm-level bargaining
system and analyses again the relationship between the ¯rm-level bargaining structure,
the degree of product di®erentiation, and the strike activity. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
22 Description of the Duopolistic Market
We consider a duopolistic industry producing each ¯rm one brand of a di®erentiated
product. Let ¯rm i produce brand i in quantity qi. There is no entry or threat of entry,
and both ¯rms are either price setters (Bertrand competition) or quantity setters (Cournot
competition). The inverse demand function for the brand i of the di®erentiated product
is given by
pi(qi;qj) = a ¡ qi ¡b ¢ qj, i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j. (1)
The parameter b 2 (0;1) represents the degree of substitutability between both brands.
The higher the b, the higher is the degree of substitutability between i and j. When b
tends to zero, each ¯rm becomes almost a monopolist; when b tends to one, both brands
are almost perfect substitutes. We assume that both ¯rms are producing under constant
returns to scale with labor as the sole input, i.e. qi = li, where li is labor input. The total
cost to ¯rm i of producing quantity qi is qi ¢ wi, where wi is the wage in ¯rm i.
Associated with each ¯rm there is a continuum of identical workers who supply each
one unit of labor with no disutility. We denote by w the expected income of a worker
who loses his job. It may be interpreted as the unemployment bene¯t. In each ¯rm the
risk-neutral workers are represented in the wage bargaining process by a utilitarian union.
The continuum of workers who supply labor to each ¯rm is normalized to unity. Hence,
local union i's utility is given by
Ui(wi;w;li;(q1;q2)) = li ¢ wi + (1 ¡ li) ¢ w i = 1;2. (2)
The pro¯t of ¯rm i is given by ¦i (wi;li;(q1;q2)) = (a ¡ qi ¡ bqj)¢ qi ¡wi ¢qi.
Interactions between the product market, the degree of product di®erentiation and the
bargaining level are analyzed according to the following game structure. In stage one,
wages are negotiated at the ¯rm-level or at the industry-level. In stage two, Bertrand or
Cournot competition occurs. The model is solved backwards.
In the last stage of the game, the wage levels have already been determined. Under
Cournot competition both ¯rms compete by choosing simultaneously their outputs (and
hence, employment) to maximize pro¯ts with price adjusting to clear the market. The
unique Nash equilibrium of this stage game yields:
q¤
i (w1;w2) =
a(2 ¡b) ¡2wi + bwj
4¡ b2 i;j = 1;2, i 6= j. (3)
The Nash equilibrium output of a ¯rm (and hence, equilibrium level of employment) is
decreasing with its own wage, while it is increasing with the other ¯rm' wage and total
industry demand.
3Under Bertrand competition both ¯rms compete by choosing simultaneously their
prices to maximize pro¯ts. The unique Nash equilibrium of this stage game yields:
p¤
i (w1;w2) =
a(1 ¡b)(2 +b)+ 2wi + bwj




a(1 ¡b)(2 + b) ¡ (2 ¡b2)wi + bwj
(1 ¡b2)(4 ¡b2)
i;j = 1;2, i 6= j. (5)
In the ¯rst stage of the game, ¯rms and unions negotiate the wage level foreseeing
perfectly the e®ect of wages on ¯rms' decisions concerning employment. To investigate
the e®ects of the degree of product di®erentiation and the type of market competition
(Bertrand vs Cournot competition) on the negotiated wage and the strike activity, we
consider two bargaining structures: industry-level and ¯rm-level wage settlements.
3 Industry-Level Wage Bargaining
At the industry-level, workers are represented by a central union (CU) whose objective
function is to maximize the sum of local unions' payo®s. This central union negotiates
the industry wage level with the ¯rms representative (CF), whose objective function is
to maximize the sum of local ¯rms' pro¯ts. The negotiation proceeds as in Rubinstein's
(1982) alternating-o®er bargaining model. The CF and the CU make alternatively wage
o®ers, with CF making o®ers in odd-numbered periods and CU making o®ers in even-
numbered periods. The negotiation ends when one of the negotiators accepts an o®er. No
limit is placed on the time that may be expended in bargaining and perpetual disagreement
is a possible outcome. All local unions are assumed to be on strike in every period until
an agreement is reached. Both CF and CU are assumed to be impatient: the CF and the
CU have time preferences with constant discount rates rf > 0 and ru > 0, respectively.
We assume that all unions have the same discount rate ru and all ¯rms have also the same
discount rate rf.
As the interval between o®ers and countero®ers is short and shrinks to zero, the
alternating-o®er model has a unique limiting subgame perfect equilibrium, which approx-
imates the Nash bargaining solution to the bargaining problem (see Binmore et al., 1986).
Let U = U1 +U2 and ¦ = ¦1 + ¦2. Thus the predicted wage is given by
wSPE
c = argmax[U ¡ U0]
® ¢ [¦ ¡¦0]
1¡® (6)
where the lowerscript "c" means that wage bargaining is centralized (or industry-level),
and where U0 = 2 ¢ w and ¦0 = 0 are, respectively, the disagreement payo®s of the CU
4and the CF. The parameter ® 2 (0;1) is the CU bargaining power which is equal to rf
ru+rf.
In case of Cournot competition, simple computation gives us
wSPE
c,C = w +
®
2




Expression (7) tells us that, in complete information, the wage is increasing with the
reservation wage w and with the CU bargaining power ®, but it does not depend on
the degree of product di®erentiation, 1 ¡ b. Then, one can easily obtain the equilibrium
employment level as well as the CU and CF equilibrium payo®s, which are denoted U¤
c,C(®)
and ¦¤





¢ (a ¡w)2, ¦¤
c,C(®) =
(2¡ ®)2
2(2 +b)2 ¢ (a ¡w)2.
Both the CU and the CF equilibrium payo®s are increasing with the degree of product
di®erentiation. That is, both are decreasing with b. The equilibrium employment in ¯rm
i is (2 ¡®)(a ¡ w)[2(2 +b)]¡1 and is also increasing with the di®erentiation.2
In case of Bertrand competition, simple computation gives us
wSPE
c,B = w +
®
2




Expression (8) is the same as Expression (7). When wage bargaining takes place at the
¯rm-level, each union-¯rm pair expects to be able to alter its relative wage position in
the industry. Therefore, wage spillover e®ects are created: each union-¯rm pair has an
incentive to lower wages in order to increase its market share (or employment level) and
the ¯rm's pro¯ts, incentive which decreases with the degree of product di®erentiation.
But, when wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level, these wage spillover e®ects
are internalized and vanish. As a consequence, wage bargaining a®ects employment and
pro¯ts only through the overall level of industry demand, and the wage outcome is the
same under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In case of complete information and
centralized wage negotiations, a general discussion on when and why wages are identical
under both Bertrand and Cournot competition can be found in Dhillon and Petrakis
(2001).
So, the wage in case of Bertrand competition is increasing with the reservation wage
w and with the CU bargaining power ®, but does not depend on the degree of product
di®erentiation, 1 ¡ b. Then, one can easily obtain the equilibrium employment level as
2An increase in the degree of product di®erentiation (a decrease in b) increases the market's ¯rm size
and reduces the intensity of competition. Since the market size e®ect dominates the competition e®ect, a
¯rm's output increases with the di®erentiation in a Cournot industry.







2(1 + b)(2 ¡ b)
¢ (a ¡ w)2, ¦¤
c,B(®) =
(1 ¡b)(2 ¡®)2
2(1 +b)(2 ¡ b)2 ¢(a ¡w)2.
Notice that now, the CU equilibrium payo® and the equilibrium employment in ¯rm i,
which is equal to (2¡®)(a¡w)[2(2¡b)(1+b)]¡1, are decreasing with the degree of product
di®erentiation if b > 1
2, but are increasing otherwise.3 However, the CF equilibrium payo®
is still increasing with the di®erentiation whatever the parameter b.
Meanwhile the wage is the same under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, we
observe that the employment level is smaller under Cournot competition. Indeed, under
Cournot competition each ¯rm expects the other ¯rm to hold its output level constant.
Hence, each ¯rm would maintain a low output level since it is aware that a unilateral
output expansion would result in a drop in the market price. In contrast, under Bertrand
competition each ¯rm assumes that the rival ¯rm holds its price constant. Hence, output
expansion will not result in a price reduction because the rival ¯rm will adjust its output
in a compensatory way to leave its market price unchanged. Therefore, more output is
produced and a higher level of employment is obtained under the Bertrand market struc-
ture than under the Cournot one.
However, both the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the Rubinstein's model
predict e±cient outcomes of the bargaining process (in particular agreement is settled
immediately). This is not the case once we introduce incomplete information into the wage
bargaining, in which the ¯rst rounds of negotiation are used for information transmission
between the two negotiators.
The main feature of the negotiation is that both negotiators have private information.
Each negotiator does not know the impatience (or discount rate) of the other party. It





f, and that the CU's discount rate is included in the set [rP
u;rI
u], where 0 <
rP
u · rI
u. The superscripts "I" and "P" identify the most impatient and most patient
types, respectively. The types are independently drawn from the set [rP
i ;rI
i] according to
the probability distribution pi, for i =u,f. We allow for general distributions over discount
















3Contrary to the Cournot case, under Bertrand competition an increase in the degree of product dif-
ferentiation increases a ¯rm's output only if b <
1
2. Indeed, when b >
1
2, the competition e®ect dominates
the market size e®ect because a Betrand industry is more competitive than a Cournot industry.
6Lemma 1 Consider the industry-level wage bargaining with incomplete information in
which the distributions pf and pu are common knowledge, and in which the period length














This lemma follows from Watson's (1998) analysis of Rubinstein's alternating-o®er bar-
gaining model with two-sided incomplete information.4 As Watson (1998) stated, Lemma
1 establishes that "each player will be no worse than he would be in equilibrium if it were
common knowledge that he were his least patient type and the opponent were his most
patient type. Furthermore, each player will be no better than he would be in equilibrium
with the roles reversed".5 From Lemma 1 we have that the PBE wage outcome in case of
Cournot competition, w¤
c,C(®;®), satis¯es the following inequalities:
w +
rP












Notice that each wage satisfying these bounds can be the outcome by choosing appro-
priately the distribution over types. The lower (upper) bound is the wage outcome of
the complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the CU's type is rI
u
(rP
u) and the CF's type is rP
f (rI
f) (and the CU bargaining power is ® (®)). Expression
(9) implies bounds on the ¯rm's employment level, as well as on the ¯rm's output, at
equilibrium. In case of Bertrand competition, the PBE wage outcome, w¤
c,B(®;®), will















Lemma 1 andExpressions (9) and (10) also tellus that ine±cient outcomes are possible,
even as the period length shrinks to zero. The wage bargaining game may involve delay
(strikes or lock-outs), but not perpetual disagreement, at equilibrium. Indeed, Watson
4Watson (1998) characterized the set of PBE payo®s which may arise in Rubinstein's alternating-o®er
bargaining game and constructed bounds (which are met) on the agreements that may be made. The
bounds and the PBE payo®s set are determined by the range of incomplete information and are easy to
compute because they correspond to the SPE payo®s of two bargaining games of complete information.
These two games are de¯ned by matching one player's most impatient type with the opponent's most
patient type.
5Lemma 1 is not a direct corollary to Watson (1998) Theorem 1 because Watson's work focuses on
linear preferences, but the analysis can be modi¯ed to handle the present case. Translating Watson









c,¢(®)], there exists distributions pu and pf, and a PBE such that the PBE
payo®s are e U and e ¦. In other words, whether or not all payo®s within the intervals given in Lemma 1 are
possible depends on the distributions over types.
7(1998) has constructed a bound on delay in equilibrium which shows that an agreement is
reached in ¯nite time and that delay time equals zero as incomplete information vanishes.
In the literature on strikes [see e.g. Cheung and Davidson (1991), Kennan and Wilson
(1989)], three di®erent measures of strike activity are usually proposed: the strike inci-
dence, the strike duration, and the number of work days lost due to work stoppages. Since
we allow for general distributions over types and we may encounter a multiplicity of PBE,
we are unable to compute measures of strike activity as the ones just mentioned.6 Never-
theless, we propose to identify the strike activity (strikes or lock-outs) with the maximal
delay in reaching a wage agreement. Following Watson (1998) Theorem 3, the larger is
the di®erence between the upper bound and lower bound on the bargaining outcome, the
larger is the potential delay for obtaining an agreement. Therefore, the strike activity
is given by the di®erence between the upper bound and the lower bound on the wage
outcome.7 So, when bargaining takes place at the industry-level, the strike activity is
given by the following expression under both types of market competition.




















¤ (a ¡ w). (11)
Therefore, both ªc,C and ªc,B are increasing (decreasing) functions of rI
u (rP
u), are de-
creasing (increasing) functions of rP
f (rI
f), and are decreasing with the reservation wage
w. However, the strike activity does not depend on the degree of product di®erentiation
because wage spillover e®ects are internalized when negotiations are centralized. The next
proposition summarizes our results with respect to industry-level bargaining.
Proposition 1 If the wage bargaining takes place at the industry-level, then the strike
activity is the same in both Cournot and Bertrand markets, and is independent of the
degree of product di®erentiation.
4 Firm-Level Wage Bargaining
At the ¯rm-level, workers are represented by a local union representative (LU). The LU's
objective function is to maximize the local union's utility. Inside each ¯rm, the LU nego-
tiates the local wage level with the local ¯rm representative (LF) whose objective function
6In order to compute an expected strike duration one would need to ¯x some parameters of the model
such as the distribution over types [see e.g. Cheung and Davidson (1991), Kennan and Wilson (1993)] but
it would imply a substantial loss of generality.
7Our measure of strike activity gives the scope each player has for screening his opponent by making
wage proposals satisfying the expressions (9) or (10), and hence, for delaying the wage agreement. Only
in average this measure is a good proxy of actual strike activity.
8is to maximize its pro¯t. All negotiations take place simultaneously and independently.
That is, when negotiating the wage level, each LU-LF pair takes all other wage settle-
ments in the industry as given. Moreover, these LU-LF pairs always correctly anticipate
the e®ect of wages on the subsequent Bertrand or Cournot competition.









2d = argmax[U2 ¡w]
®[¦2]
1¡® (12)
where ® is the LU's bargaining power and it is given by expression
rf
ru+rf, and where
the lowerscript "d" means that negotiations are decentralized (or ¯rm-level). In case of
Cournot competition, simple computations give us
wSPE
d,C = w +
®(2 ¡b)
4 ¡b®





4ru + (4¡ b) rf
(a ¡ w).
Expression (13) tells us that, in complete information, the wage is increasing with the
reservation wage w, with the LU bargaining power ®, and with the degree of product di®er-
entiation. Contrary to industry-level bargaining, ¯rm-level bargaining does not internalize
the wage spillover e®ects. Moreover, the smaller the degree of product di®erentiation (i.e.
the larger b is) the larger the spillover e®ects are. As a consequence, we observe that the
¯rm-level wage outcome is smaller than the industry-level one, and that it is decreasing
with b. One can easily obtain the equilibrium employment level as well as the LU and LF
equilibrium payo®s, which are denoted U¤
d,C(®) and ¦¤









(4 ¡b®)2(2 +b)2 ¢ (a ¡w)2.
Both the LU and the LF equilibrium payo®s are increasing with the degree of product
di®erentiation. The equilibrium employment in ¯rm i is 2(2¡®)(a¡w)[(4¡b®)(2+b)]¡1
and is also increasing with the di®erentiation.
In case of Bertrand competition, simple computations give us
wSPE
d,B = w +
®(1 ¡b)(2 +b)
2(2 ¡ b2) ¡b®




rf(1 ¡ b)(2 + b)
2(2 ¡b2)ru + (2(2 ¡b2) ¡b) rf
(a ¡ w).
Expression (14) is now di®erent than Expression (13): the wage level under Bertrand
competition is smaller than under Cournot competition. This is due to the fact that wage
9spillover e®ects are greater under Bertrand competition. Indeed, a small decrease in a
Bertrand¯rm's marginal cost (due to a wage decrease) makes it to win a substantial market
share of its rival, while a Cournot ¯rm would win only a small part of it. Therefore, a
wage drop will increase more the output under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.
Nevertheless, the wage outcome is again increasing with the reservation wage w, with
the LU bargaining power ®, and with the degree of product di®erentiation. One can easily
obtain the equilibrium employment level as well as the LU and LF equilibrium payo®s,
which are denoted U¤
d,B(®) and ¦¤
d,B(®), and are given by
U¤
d,B(®) =
®(2 ¡®)(2 ¡b2)(1 ¡b)(2 +b)
(1 +b)(2 ¡b)(2(2 ¡ b2) ¡b®)2 ¢ (a ¡w)2,
¦¤
d,B(®) =
(1 ¡b)(2 ¡b2)2(2 ¡®)2
(1 +b)(2 ¡b)2(2(2 ¡b2)¡ b®)2 ¢ (a ¡w)2.
The LF equilibrium payo® is increasing with the di®erentiation. However, the LU equi-
librium payo® and the equilibrium employment in ¯rm i, which is equal to (2 ¡ ®)(2 ¡
b2)(a¡w)[(2(2¡b2)¡b®)(2¡b)(1+b)]¡1, are still decreasing with the degree of product
di®erentiation if b > 1
2, but are now undetermined otherwise.
We consider now the ¯rm-level wage bargaining with private information about the
discount rates. We look for symmetric PBE.
Lemma 2 Consider the ¯rm-level wage negotiations with incomplete information in which
the distributions pf and pu are common knowledge, and in which the period length shrinks
to zero. Assume each LU-LF pair i takes the other wage settlement in the industry as
given during the bargaining at ¯rm i. Then, for any symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibria














Lemma 2 is the counterpart of Lemma 1 for the ¯rm-level wage negotiations. Following
Lemma 2 and the complete information results we are able to state some properties about
the ¯rm-level wage outcomes. In case of Cournot competition, the symmetric PBE wage
outcome w¤
d,C(®;®) will satisfy the following inequalities:
w +
rP
f (2 ¡ b)
4rI
u + (4 ¡ b) rP
f
(a ¡w) · w¤




u + (4 ¡ b) rI
f
(a ¡w). (15)
Notice that each wage satisfying these bounds can be the outcome by choosing appropri-
ately the distribution over types. The lower (upper) bound is the wage outcome of the
complete information game, when it is common knowledge that the LU's type is rI
u (rP
u)
and the LF's type is rP
f (rI
f) (and the LU bargaining power is ® (®)). In case of Bertrand
10competition, the symmetric PBE wage outcome, w¤




f (1 ¡ b)(2 + b) (a ¡w)
2(2 ¡b2)rI
u +(2(2 ¡b2)¡ b) rP
f
· w¤
d,B(®;®) · w +
rI
f(1 ¡ b)(2 + b) (a ¡w)
2(2¡ b2)rP




In the model we developed of wage determination in a duopolistic industry, we can





c,B . But once the LU and the LF have private information, this ranking
does not necessarily hold. The necessary and su±cient condition to recover the complete
information result that the ¯rm-level wage outcome under Bertrand competition is always
strictly smaller than the ¯rm-level wage outcome under Cournot competition is 4(® ¡
®)(2 ¡b¡b2) < ®(2¡®)b3. Finally, the necessary and su±cient condition to recover the
complete informationresult that the ¯rm-level wage outcome under Cournot competition is
always strictly smaller than the industry-level wage outcome under Cournot (or Bertrand)
competition is (4 ¡ 2b)® < (4 ¡ b®)®. The above conditions are satis¯ed the smaller the
amount of private information j® ¡®j and the degree of product di®erentiation 1¡b are.
Moreover, if it is commonly known that the local union is much stronger than the local








next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 2 In case of bargaining with private information in a duopolistic industry,
the ¯rm-level wage outcome under Bertrand competition will not necessarily be lower than
the ¯rm-level wage outcome under Cournot competition. Moreover, the ¯rm-level wage
outcome under Cournot competition will not necessarily be lower than the industry-level
wage outcome under Cournot (or Bertrand) competition. However, if it is commonly
known that the local union is much stronger than the local ¯rm and the degree of product
di®erentiation is small, then Bertrand competition will decrease the ¯rm-level wage at
equilibrium and industry-level bargaining will increase the wage at equilibrium.
In case of Cournot competition, the strike activity when bargaining takes place at the






















In case of Bertrand competition, the strike activity when bargaining takes place at the









(1 ¡ b)(2 + b)(a ¡ w), (18)
=






u + (2(2¡ b2) ¡b)rI
f][2(2 ¡b2)rI
u + (2(2 ¡b2) ¡ b)rP
f ]
(a ¡w).
Similarly to the industry-level case, we observe that, both ªd,C and ªd,B are increasing
(decreasing) functions of rI
u (rP
u), are decreasing (increasing) functions of rP
f (rI
f), and are
decreasing with the reservation wage w. But now, the strike activity is increasing with
the degree of product di®erentiation. Moreover, we observe that the strike activity is
smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. The intuition behind this result
has to do with the competition on the product market. As already mentioned, when
the wage bargaining takes place at the ¯rm-level, each LU-LF pair expects to be able
to alter its relative wage position in the industry; and, it leads to wage spillover e®ects.
Each LU-LF pair has an incentive to lower wages in order to gain a larger share of the
product market. This incentive is stronger once Bertrand competition takes place since
now a wage decrease makes the LU-LF pair winning a quite large market share of its
rival, while Cournot competition would give them only a small part of it. This explain
why it is likely that more concessions and less con°icts in wage negotiations will occur
under Bertrand competition. The next proposition summarizes our results with respect
to ¯rm-level bargaining.
Proposition 3 If the wage bargaining takes place at the ¯rm-level, then the strike activity
is smaller in Bertrand than in Cournot markets, and is increasing with the degree of
product di®erentiation.
Under Cournot competition ina oligopolistic industry, Vannetelbosch (1997) has shown
that the strike activity is larger if the wage bargaining takes place at the industry level
rather than at the ¯rm level, because spillover e®ects are internalized at the industry level.
Comparing the expressions (11), (17), and (18), we observe that
ªd,B < ªd,C < ªc,B = ªc,C.
That is, the Bertrand competition increases the disparity, in terms of strike activity, of
both bargaining structures.
5 Conclusion
Within an incomplete information framework, we have developed a model of wage deter-
mination in a unionized imperfectly competitive industry. Under two di®erent bargaining
12structures (¯rm-level vs industry-level), we have investigated the e®ects of the degree of
product di®erentiation and the type of market competition (Bertrand vs Cournot compe-
tition) on the negotiated wage and the strike activity. If the wage bargaining takes place
at the industry-level, then both the wage outcome and the strike activity do not depend on
the degree of product di®erentiation whatever the type of market competition. However,
if the wage bargaining takes place at the ¯rm-level, then wages and strikes are increasing
with the degree of product di®erentiation.
Finally, our model suggests that, once private information matters, one should be
cautious when making policy recommendations with respect to the impact of bargaining
structures and types of market competition on wages and employment levels (see Proposi-
tion 2). Nonetheless, our model predicts that industries where ¯rms compete µ a la Bertrand
rather than µ a la Cournot will observe less strike activity when bargaining is decentralized.
References
[1] Binmore, K.G., A. Rubinstein, andA.Wolinsky, 1986, "The Nash Bargaining Solution
in Economic Modelling," Rand Journal of Economics 17, 176-188.
[2] Cheung, F.K. and C. Davidson, 1991, "Bargaining Structure and Strike Activity,"
Canadian Journal of Economics 24, 345-371.
[3] Davidson, C., 1988, "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of
Labor Economics 6, 397-422.
[4] Dhillon, A. and E. Petrakis, 2001, A Generalized Wage Rigidity Result with Central-
ized Negotiations," forthcoming in International Journal of Industrial Organization.
[5] Dowrick, S., 1989, "Union-Oligopoly Bargaining," The Economic Journal 99, 1123-
1142.
[6] Kennan, J. and R. Wilson, 1989, "Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of
Strike Data," Journal of Applied Econometrics 4, S87-S130.
[7] Kennan, J. and R. Wilson, 1993, "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of
Economic Literature 31, 45-104.
[8] Rubinstein, A., 1982, "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica 50,
97-109.
[9] Tracy, J.S., 1986, "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity,"
American Economic Review 76, 423-436.
13[10] Vannetelbosch, V.J., 1996, "Testing Between Alternative Wage-Employment Bar-
gaining Models Using Belgian Aggregate Data," Labour Economics 3, 43-64.
[11] Vannetelbosch, V.J., 1997, "Wage Bargaining with Incomplete Information in an
Unionized Cournot Oligopoly," European Journal of Political Economy 13, 353-374.
[12] Watson, J., 1998, "Alternating-O®er Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Infor-
mation," Review of Economic Studies 65, 573-594.
14